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LIST OF Mb PfrfiTIPS 
The parties to this litigation are as follows: Commercial 
Security Bankf a Utah banking corporation hereinafter referred to in 
this Brief as "CSB", and Smithfield Livestock Auction, Inc.f a Utah 
corporation, hereinafter referred to in this Brief as "Smithfield". 
No other party has been involved in this litigation at any time. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether appellant CSB as a collecting bank of the checks 
issued by Smithfield to said William C. Erickson, was bound by the 
endorsement instructions contained on the reverse side of the 
Smithfield checks payable to William C. Erickson onlyf and without 
CSB as a co-payee thereonf thereby constructively or actually 
acquiescing in the sale of the cattle upon which CSB held a security 
interest and thereby waiving CSB's claim for conversion against 
Smithfield; and 
2. Whether Smithfield is liable in conversion to CSB for the 
sale of livestock upon which CSB held and claimed a lien by virtue 
of the filing of a U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement thereon, due to its 
failure to make CSB a co-payee upon the checks issued to William C. 
Erickson upon sale by Smithfield. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by CSB against Smithfield seeking damages 
for conversion arising from the sale of livestock consigned to 
Smithfield for sale by William C. Erickson, a borrower from CSB. 
The claim arises by virtue of the failure of Smithfield to remit the 
proceeds of sale to CSB pursuant to CSB's perfected security 
interest in the livestock. 
On June 8f 1982, CSB's predecessor in interest, Bear River 
State Bank, made a $50f000.00 loan to William C. Erickson and Susan 
S. Erickson, husband and wife. The loan was secured by two (2) John 
Deere farm tractors, a trust deed on a parcel of land, and a lien on 
all of Erickson1s livestock "now owned or hereafter acquired," the 
livestock lien being perfected by a UCC-1 filing with the Secretary 
of State along with an executed farm products security agreement. 
In addition to being borrowers of CSB, the Ericksons also maintained 
a joint checking account with the Bank* 
The Erickson loan remained in a current payment status until 
April of 1983 at which time it became delinquent. Previouslyf 
however, between the dates of June 15, 1982 and October 14f 1982, 
William C. Erickson took his livestock in small lots to the 
Smithfield, a licensed livestock auction house in Cache County, on 
twelve (12) separate occasions between those dates, for sale. The 
Auction sold the livestock and issued its checks on each of the 
twelve (12) sales to William C. Erickson as the sole payee thereon, 
net of Smithfield's $7.00 per head commission; neither CSB or Bear 
River State Bank were the drawee bank on the Smithfield checks paid 
to Erickson. William C. Erickson deposited each of the twelve (12) 
checks into his checking account at Bear River State Bank within two 
or three days of receipt of each check. Each of the Smithfield 
checks contained a pre-printed statement on the reverse side which 
stated as follows: 
"In executing my endorsement of this check I do sell to the 
Smithfield Livestock Auction, Inc., the herein described 
Livestock and guarantee that I am the owner of said Livestock 
and that said Livestock are clear of all mortgage liens or 
encumbrances. If Livestock are mortgaged, mortgagee's 
endorsement or release of mortgage is required. Please 
endorse below." 
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During 1982, Smithfield had no procedures in place to 
investigate or verify whether the livestock brought to it for sale 
was subject to a prior security interestf although at least one of 
Smithfield's principals assumed as a matter of experience that over 
90% of livestock going through the auction was subject to a lien. 
Upon default on the Erickson loan in April of 1983, CSB 
repossessed and sold one (1) tractor, failed to locate the other 
tractor, foreclosed the trust deed, and attempted to locate the 
livestock with no success. Following sale of the collateral, a 
deficiency balance remained. CSB subsequently learned of the facts 
of the livestock sale and brought its suit on April 29, 1985 
claiming damages for conversion against Smithfield. 
The case was tried to the Courtf the Honorable Venoy 
Chirstoffersonf sitting without juryf on October 15r 1986. Prior to 
commencement of the trial, the Court considered CSB's Motion in 
Limine which had been filed in writing prior to the trial date. The 
court failed to grant or deny the Motion in Limine at any time 
during the proceedings. Following the close of CSB's case in chief, 
defendant moved for a Directed Verdict, no cause of action. That 
motion was granted, and written Findings of Factf Conclusions of 
Law, and Judgment of Dismissal were entered by the Court on November 
24f 1986. CSB filed its Notice of Appeal on December 3, 1986. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
Appellant asserts that the following are the facts relevant 
to a determination of this appeal. 
-3-
1. Respondent, CSBf is the successor in interest to Bear 
River State Bankf which was merged with Commercial Security Bank on 
or about March 31, 1984. (Finding of Fact 2; Record on Appeal at 
157) . 
2. Defendant, Smithfield Livestock Auction, is a Utah 
corporation doing business in Cache County, State of Utah and is a 
licensed livestock auction agent. (Finding of Fact 2; Record on 
Appeal at 157) ; 
3. On or about June 8, 1982, William C. Erickson and Susan 
S. Erickson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ericksons"), 
for valuable consideration, executed and delivered to CSB a certain 
promissory note in the original principal sum of $50,000.00 together 
with interest accruing as stated therein.(Findings of Fact 3; Record 
on Appeal at 157) ; 
4. In furtherance of said loan transaction and as security 
therefore, Ericksons, on or about June 8, 1982, executed and 
delivered to the CSB a certain security agreement wherein and 
whereby they pledged as security for the note all livestock "now 
owned or hereafter acquired", including but not limited to 33 
Holstein cows, 67 Holstein heifers, 16 Holstein steers and 13 
Holstein calves (hereinafter referred to as the "livestock"), along 
with certain other specified items of farm equipment. (Finding of 
Fact 4; Record on Appeal at 157); 
5. As a part of the same loan transaction with CSB. 
Ericksons executed and delivered to CSB a certain U.C.C. 1 Financing 
Statement to the collateral recited in the security agreement, which 
financing statement was filed with the office of the Utah Secretary 
i 
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( 
of State of June 23, 1982 as File No. 880544. (Finding of Fact 5; 
Record on Appeal at 157) ; 
6. During all times relevant to this actionf Smithfield was 
conducting a livestock auction and marketing business located in 
Cache County, State of Utah. (Finding of Fact 6; Record on Appeal at 
157-158); 
7. From at least June 8f 1982 until May 1983, Ericksons kept 
and maintained a checking account in their joint names at CSB's 
predecessorf Bear River State Bank, at Tremonton, Utahf account 
number 124301740-57-71917-1. (Finding of Fact 7; Record on Appeal at 
158); 
8. Between the dates of June 15
 f 1982 and October 14 f 1982, 
inclusivef Ericksons consigned livestock for sale to Smithfield. 
Said sales were conducted on twelve (12) separate occasions and 
following each salef Smithfield issued to Erickson its check 
representing the gross amount of the proceeds realized from the 
auction of the livestock on that particular occasion less a 
commission of $7.00 per head sold. All of said twelve (12) checks 
issued by Smithfield to Erickson bore William C. Erickson as the 
sole payee thereon and all were deposited for collection to the 
Erickson checking account at Bear River State Bank by Erickson. 
Specificallyf the date of the checkf the check number, and amount of 
the check and the date deposited by Erickson are as follows: 
-5-
Check Date Che<?k Number Amount of Cher* Date Deposited 
July 1, 1982 16396 
July 1, 1982 16373 
July 8, 1982 16588 
July 15r 1982 16757 
July 29, 1982 17108 
August 5, 1982 17217 
August 5, 1982 17266 
August 12, 1982 17430 
August 22, 1982 17598 
August 26, 1982 17778 
September 30, 1982 18620 
October 14, 1982 18920 
$ 1,761.40 
1,336.85 
381.81 
1,744.40 
2,544.10 
1,022.34 
979.70 
2,589.10 
1,339.40 
2,189.10 
1,892.56 
3,099.42 
July 2, 1982 
July 2, 1982 
July 14, 1982 
-indecipherable-
July 30, 1982 
August 6, 1982 
August 6, 1982 
August 13, 1982 
August 23, 1982 
August 26, 1982 
October 1, 1982 
October 15, 1982 
TOTAL: $20,869.18 
(Finding of Fact 8; Record on Appeal at 158-159); 
9. The twelve (12) above specified checks issued by 
Smithfield to William C. Erickson contained on the back side thereof 
the following printed endorsement instructions: "In executing my 
endorsement of this check, I do sell to the Smithfield Livestock 
Auction Inc. the herein described livestock, and I guarantee that I 
am the owner of said livestock and that said livestock are clear of 
any mortgages, liens or encumbrances. If livestock are mortgaged, 
mortgagees endorsement or release of mortgage is required. Please 
endorse below" (Finding of Fact 10; record on Appeal at 159-160); 
-6-
10. Each and every one of the said twelve (12) checks from 
Smithfield to Erickson bore only the endorsement of William C. 
Erickson and of no other person or party whatsoeverf and all of the 
same were collected by CSB'spredecessorf Bear River State Bank and 
no deduction or offset was exercised by Bear River State Bank or CSB 
against the checking account into which said checks were deposited 
and collected (Finding of Fact 10; Record on Appeal at 159-160); 
11. Each of the above specified checks was issued by 
Smithfield to William C. Erickson within 3 or 4 business days of the 
date of the livestock sale upon which each such check was issued 
(Finding of Fact 11; Record on Appeal at 160); 
12. During the year 1982f Smithfield had no procedures or 
methods in place by which to investigate or verify whether livestock 
which was brought to it for sale was subject to a U.C.C. 1 filing on 
behalf of a secured creditor with the Utah Secretary of State 
(Finding of Fact 12; Record on Appeal at 160); 
13. During the year 1982, due to its knowledge and 
experience in the industryr Smithfield assumed as a matter of course 
that at least 90% of all livestock brought to it for sale was 
subject to a lien or mortgage of some kind (Finding of Fact 12; 
Record on Apeal at 160); 
14. The loan obligation of June 8, 1982 from CSB to Ericksons 
remained in a current and non-delinquent status until April of 1983 
at which time it became delinquent (Finding of Fact 13; Record on 
Appeal at 160); 
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15. On Hay 10f 1983f Ericksons filed a joint petition for 
relief under Title 11, United States Code in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, case number 83M-Q3 05. 
CSB's predecessor in interest. Bear River State Bankf was named as a 
creditor in that proceeding. Smithfield was not named as a creditor 
in that proceeding at any time. Ericksons were discharged in 
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 by order of the United States Bankruptcy 
Court dated and entered August 2, 1983 (Finding of Fact 15; Record 
on Appeal at 160-161); 
16. Pursuant to the default of Erickson under the note of 
June 8f 1982 and pursuant to the security agreement executed 
thereon, CSB's predecessor, Bear River State Bankf obtained relief 
from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and exercised against the collateral 
pledged thereto by Erickson. Specificallyf CSB received a payment 
of $1,500.00 from Erickson in consideration of one of two John Deere 
Tractors subject to the security agreement which CSB was unable to 
locate; CSB repossessed and sold the second John Deere Tractor which 
was the subject of the security agreement to Golden Spike Equipment 
company and realized the sum of $3,150.00; CSB foreclosed the deed 
of trust on certain property which was additional security for the 
loan and bid in at sale thereof the sum of $9,000.00; and CSB was 
unable to locate the livestock which was the subject of the security 
agreement (Finding of Fact 16; Record on Appeal at 161); 
17. Following execution against the above specified 
collateral, there was an indebtedness due, owing and unpaid on the 
June 8, 1982 note in the total sum of $15,919.66 as of March 14, 
1984 (Finding of Fact 17; Record on Appeal at 161); 
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18. Smithfield has not claimed and did not have at any time a 
perfected interest in and to any livestock owned by Erickson 
(Finding of Pact 18; Record on Appeal at 161); 
19. In the livestock industryf the fair market value of 
livestock is what said livestock will bring at sale at any 
particular time in a regular market therefore and the Smithfield 
Livestock Auction is a regular market for livestock such that its 
sale of livestock would reflect the fair market value of the same at 
the time and place of sale (Finding of Fact 19; Record on Appeal at 
161-162); 
20. CSB filed its Complaint in the instant case on or about 
April 28r 1985 claiming that the sale by Smithfield of cattle owned 
by Erickson and subject to the security interest of CSB was an act 
of conversion entitling CSB to relief against Smithfield in the sum 
of the fair market value of the cattle at the time and place of 
sale. 
21. Trial on the merits was held before the First Judicial 
District Court, in and for Cache County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersenf Judge, presiding, sitting without 
jury, on October 15, 1986. Following the close of CSB's case in 
chief, Smithfield moved for a directed verdict which was granted by 
the court and a judgment of dismissal, no cause of action was 
entered pursuant to the granting of the motion for directed verdict 
(Record on Appeal at 166-167). 
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CITATION OF STATTITF.fi. 
RULES AND REGULATION 
RELIED UPON BY APPELLANT 
CSB relies upon the following statutes, rules and regulations 
in support of its argument: 
UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-4-105 (d) 
UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-3-205 
UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-9-307 
UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-4-203 
Copies of the full text of each of the above-cited statutes 
or rules are contained in Appendix "A" to this Brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
An examination of the legal basis of the trial court's ruling 
shows the manifest error in the application of the law to facts 
which were essentially undisputed between the parties. Although the 
trial court did not make specific conclusions that CSB's claim of 
conversion against Smithfield was sustained, the entire ruling was 
rendered upon the basis that the endorsement instructions on 
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Smithfield checks created a waiver by CSB of its conversion claim; 
it would then necessarily follow that the trial court found merit in 
CSB's conversion cause of action lest there would have been nothing 
to which the waiver could apply. 
Notwithstanding the trial court's failure to make specific 
findings and conclusions as to CSB's conversion claims, CSB admitted 
evidence and testimony into the trial record sufficient to make a 
prima facie case of conversion against Smithfield, upon which the 
trial court was obligated to make a conclusion sustaining the claim 
as pleaded; the Findings of Fact entered by the trial court contain 
each and every element of a conversion cause of action. Several 
cases from other jurisdictions directly on point uniformly hold that 
a livestock auctioneer is liable to a secured lender for conversion 
of livestock in which the security interest is held when the 
auctioneer sells the secured property without remitting the proceeds 
to the secured party unless waiver or acquiescence is shown* The 
evidence showed that CSB held a perfected security interest in the 
livestock of borrower William C. Erickson, and that Smithfield sold 
the secured livestock at auction and failed to remit the proceeds to 
CSB. 
The trial court chose to find and conclude that CSB waived 
its conversion claim against Smithfield based upon a certain 
endorsement instruction contained on the reverse side of twelve (12) 
Smithfield checks made payable to William C. Erickson. CSB was not 
a co-payee on the checks, or any of them; and endorsement, by its 
terms, purports only to exact from the endorser/payee a promise that 
the livestock consigned to Smithfield was free of liens, and if not, 
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that the endorser/payee would secure the release thereof. CSB, not 
being a party to the instruments, was certainly not subject to the 
endorsement instructions on any theory of contract. However, the 
trial court ruled that since William C. Erickson deposited the 
checks into his checking account at CSB, and that since the 
endorsement instructions alluded to the fact that a livestock sale 
had taken place, CSB was on notice of the sale, on notice of the 
source of funds, and on notice that it was not a co-payee on the 
checks; and that by failing to set off against the checking account, 
CSB acquiesced in the sale and waived its conversion claim. This 
ruling is a clear error in the application of the law as UTAH CODE 
ANN. Section 70A-4-203, as amended (which statute was argued to the 
Court) exempts collecting banks from the effect of endorsement 
instructions between the drawer of a check and the bank's depositing 
customer and payee, referred to in the Code as the bank's "immediate 
transferor". The official comments to the Uniform Commercial Code 
set out the sound practical reasons for this exemption explaining 
that "banks ordinarily handle instruments, especially checks, in 
bulk, and have no practicable opportunity to consider the effect of 
restrictive endorsements". The trial court, when confronted with 
Section 70A-4-203, chose to make an exception thereto from whole 
cloth by concluding that 70A-4-203 did not apply where the 
collecting bank is also the lienholder on the collateral in 
question. This exception to the application of 70A-4-203 finds no 
justification in the statutory language, the official comments, or 
the case law interpreting the same. 
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Because the trial court entered its judgment of dismissal, no 
cause of actionf on defendant's Motion for directed verdict 
following the close of CSB's case in chieff the trial court was 
required to examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing partyf CSBf and if there is a reasonable basis in the 
evidence and in the inferences to be drawn therefrom that would 
support a judgment in favor of the losing partyf a directed verdict 
cannot be sustained. A directed verdict is only appropriate when 
the trial court is able to concludef as a matter of law, that 
reasonable minds would not differ on the facts to be determined from 
the evidence presented. By ruling on the defense motion as it did, 
the trial court removed from the defendant the burden it had to 
prove that it had no knowledge of CSB's security interest in the 
livestock, that the security interest was or was not duly perfectedf 
why CSB was not a co-payee on the checks, and whether CSB acquiesced 
in the livestock sale. Smithfield's auction managerf Newell Kingf 
testified in CSB's case-in-chief that he presumedf as a matter of 
experiencef that over 90% of the livestock which goes through the 
Smithfield Livestock auction is "mortgaged". For purposes of the 
defendant's motion for directed verdict, Mr. King's testimony and 
the lack of defense evidence meeting the prima facie elements of 
conversion presented a reasonable basis in the evidence, and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom, that would support a judgment in 
favor of CSB. It is not the province of the trial court to weigh or 
determine the preponderance of the evidence when faced with a motion 
for directed verdict; yet the trial court improperly did so in the 
instant case in granting the defense motion. Clearly a reasonable 
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inference could have been drawn from the evidence admitted in 
p l a i n t i f f ' s case in chief , taking the same in the l i g h t most 
favorable to the p l a i n t i f f , that p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d to the 
p l a i n t i f f , that p l a i n t i f f was e n t i t l e d to the r e l i e f sought in i t s 
Complaint, requiring reversal of the t r i a l court ' s ruling in favor 
of Smithf ie ld's Motion for Directed Verdicts 
LEQAL ARSPHPNT 
POINT I 
LEGAL BASIS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
In order to fully frame the manifest error committed by the 
trial Court in making its ruling, it is important to understand the 
legal basis upon which that ruling was made. 
The Conclusions of Law made and entered by the trial Court 
are, of course, the legal conclusions in the record from which this 
Court must draw its opinion as to the correctness thereof. 
Appellant does not intend to go outside of the Conclusions of Law 
entered by the Court but would additionally cite to portions of the 
transcript of the Judge's oral ruling from which the Findings and 
Conclusions were drawn to further illustrate the lower court's 
manifest misunderstanding of the law as it applies to the issues 
presented by this case (a copy of the decision portion of the 
official trial transcript is contained in Appendix "B" to this 
Brief). 
Initially, it is important to note that the Court concluded 
that CSB held a perfected security interest in and to all livestock 
owned or after acquired of William S. Erickson and Susan C. Erickson 
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by virtue of a security agreement and U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement 
filed with the office of the Secretary of State on June 23, 1982. 
(Conclusion of Law No. 1; Record on Appeal at 162; Trial Exhibits 
PI, P2, and P3). Further, the Court concluded that the loan 
obligation of William C. and Susan Erickson to CSB reached a 
delinquent status in April of 1983 and that there was an amount 
owing of $15,919.66 (Conclusion of Law No. 3; Record on Appeal at 
162-163). 
As the transcript and the record on appeal indicate, 
particularly the Complaint and the Answer of Smithfield thereto, the 
parties were in agreement as to most of the basic operative facts of 
the case. The assignment of error comes primarily in the 
application of law to those facts. 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
rendered by the trial court, it appears that a clear case of 
conversion was made by CSB; however, the court held that CSB was 
estopped from asserting the claim of conversion and that it waived 
the same by accepting for collection Smithfield checks made payable 
to William C. Erickson deposited in his checking account at CSB's 
predecessor, Bear River State Bank, with an "endorsement" which the 
Court held notified CSB, as the livestock lienholder of what was 
occuring. Particularly, the Court concluded in the Conclusions of 
Law, particularly Conclusion No. 5 (Recond on Appeal at 163-164) , as 
follows; 
"Plaintiff is estopped from asserting its claim of 
conversion against the defendant and has waived its claim of 
conversion as the plaintiff was the mortgagee of the cattle 
which was sold by the Smithfield Livestock Auction and was in 
addition the collecting bank on the said Smithfield Livestock 
Auction checks paid to William C. Erickson by virtue of Mr. 
- 15 -
Erickson's deposit of those checks into his account at the 
plaintiff bank, which the plaintiff bank collected for Mr. 
Erickson into his account without exercising a right of set 
off thereagainst; and further, the plaintiff is charged with 
constructive notice of the endorsement instructions on the 
back side of each check and knew or should have known from 
said endorsement instructions that its loan debtor, Mr. 
Erickson, was selling livestock through the Smithfield 
Livestock Auction which was subject to its security interest 
therein and that said checks, pursuant to said endorsement 
instructions, required endorsement of any mortgage holder and 
that the payee, William C. Erickson, guaranteed to the 
Smithfield Livestock Auction under the terms of said 
endorsement instructions that said livestock was free and 
clear of any mortgage, lien or interest of any other party. 
The court concludes that the plaintiff was on notice of and 
bound by the terms of the endorsement instructions on the 
back of each of the Smithfield Livestock Auction checks 
notwithstanding the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 
70A-4-2Q3, as amended, inasmuch as the plaintiff was the 
mortgage holder of the cattle in question in addition to 
being the "collecting bank" as provided in said statute and 
instructions on said checks." 
The trial Court's ruling on the record (see Appendix "B" 
hereto) is also illustrative of the position being taken in making 
the ruling. Commencing at Page 108, Line 5 of the Trial Transcript 
herein, the Court held as follows: 
" . . . but I think the endorsement is important on the back 
of that check. What that endorsement is saying, or at least 
I interpret it as saying, is that Smithfield Livestock 
Auction, who puts that endorsement on there, is saying "I am 
to my bank authorizing them to pay to Mr. Erickson X number 
of dollars provided he signs the endorsement on the back 
guaranteeing that there are no mortgages and that if there 
are any mortgages, then the release of the person who has the 
mortgage is required for this check to be any good at all. I 
think that is what the restrictive endorsement said. 
Now I think this is where the waiver comes in, or I mean the 
estoppel comes in, is that the bank, Bear River Bank, now 
successor the plaintiff, takes in the check knowing what the 
restrictive endorsement is and says that this is for a sale 
of livestock and you are to pay out the money or collect, In 
this case being the collecting bank, and give the money to 
Mr. Erickson by placing it in his account, only if the 
livestock is mortgaged that you have the mortgagee's 
endorsement on it. That is what he is telling them. 
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Now they are telling the person who knows they are mortgaged, 
and I say that they then, if they give Mr. Erickson the money 
knowing that they nave to put their endorsement on it for 
there to be any liability on the check by Smithfield 
Livestock Auction . • • and for that reason I don't think 
that they can come now and say, 'heyf we were ignorant of 
these checks coming in for payment of cattle and giving Mr, 
Erickson the money for him to do what he wants with and not 
protecting ourselves on our mortgage,' when they had the 
mortgage restrictions on the back of the check and I think 
that is the most important part ." (emphasis added). 
The court made it clear in the transcript that the basis of 
the ruling of no cause of action wasf in fact, the conclusion that 
CSB was subject to the endorsement instructions. Commencing at page 
110 of the Trial Transcript, Line 23, and in response to counsel's 
question regarding the same, the dialogue proceeded as follows: 
MR. SHIELDS: So my understanding of the court's ruling 
of No Cause of Action is based upon the restrictive 
endorsement. We have had other assertions but that's the — 
THE COURT: Yeah. I think 70A-4-203 would protect you if 
you did — if you were not the mortgagee on what the 
endorsement says the restriction is for and ignored it. With 
notice that this is being — that money is given out and 
"we're collecting it to put in your account on the basis of 
selling our mortgaged property." Now how can you come back 
and say, "because at that time we didn't protect ourselves 
even with notice," and say, "hey, this is Mr. Erickson, this 
money is for the sale of cattle we have mortgaged and so we 
want the money," . . . 
In short, the Court held CSB subject to the endorsement on 
the Smithfield checks by virtue of the fact that Erickson deposited 
his checks into his checking account at CSB. 
With the basis of the Court's ruling of no cause of action 
having been established in the record, it is now in the logical 
sequence of analysis to bring into focus the manifest error 
committed by establishing two further points of law; first, that 
-17-
Smithfield was clearly liable in conversion to CSB and second, that 
no estoppel or waiver can be established as a defense to the 
conversion liability as CSB was not subject to the endorsement in 
questionf or any endorsement for that matterf under these of 
circumstances. These two points will be covered in that sequence 
under point three (III) and four (IV) below. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED BY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
DIRECTED VERDICT AS IT FAILED TO CONSTRUE THE 
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO PLAINTIFF, 
UNDERTOOK TO WEIGH AND DETERMINE THE PREDONDERANCE 
OF EVIDENCE AT THAT STAGE OF TRIAL, AND FAILED TO 
AFFORD PLAINTIFF THE BENEFIT OF REASONABLE INFERENCES 
TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE. 
At the close of CSB's case in chief, Smithfield moved for 
directed verdict pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 50 (a) 
(Transcript of Trial at 87) which the Court granted, resulting in a 
judgment of dismissal, no cause of action (Transcript of Trial at 
110-112; Record on Appeal at 166-167). 
In directing a verdict, the Court must examine the evidence 
in a light most favorable to the party against whom the verdict is 
intended; and it is not the trial court's province to weigh or 
determine the preponderance of the evidence. Finlayson v. Bradv, 121 
U. 204, 240 P. 2d 491 (Utah 1952). 
The Supreme Court's standard of review of a directed verdict 
is the same as that imposed by the trial court; the evidence must be 
examined in the light most favorable to the losing party, and if 
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence and in the inferences to 
be drawn therefrom that would support a judgment in favor of the 
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losing party, the directed verdict cannot be sustained. Management 
Committee of Graystone Pines Homeowner's Assn. v. Gravstone Pines, 
Inc., 652 P. 2d 896 (Utah 1982). 
The evidence admitted in the record in CSB's case in chief 
prior to Smithfield's Motion For Directed Verdict supported CSB's 
claim of conversion particularly when viewed in the light most 
favorable to CSB and in absence of determinations of the weight or 
preponderance of that evidence. 
CSB simply made a prima facie case of conversion in its case 
in chief. The great weight of authority follows the rule that a 
sale of livestock by an auctioneer for a principal who has no title 
to the property or holds it subject to a mortgage or lien entails 
liability in conversion on the part of the auctioneer who sells it 
under such circumstancesf pays over the proceeds to the principal, 
and hands the property over to the purchaser with a view to passing 
title to him, notwithstanding the auctioneer's lack of knowledge 
that the principal lacked authority to sell. Hills Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Arnold Cattle Co,, 316 N.E. 2d 669 (111. 1974). 
CSB established these elements in its case in chief: 
a). CSB established that it held a perfected security 
interest in "all livestock now owned or hereafter acquired" by 
William C. Ericksonf its borrower, predating the sale thereof 
conducted by Smithfield (Findings of Fact 5 and 6; Record on Appeal 
at 157-158; Trial Exhibits P-l through P-3); 
b). Between the dates of June 15f 1982 and October 14f 1982f 
William C. Erickson consigned certain livestock for sale to the 
Smithfield. Said sales were conducted on twelve (12) separate 
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occasions and following each sale, Smithfield issued to Erickson its 
check representing the gross amount of the sale realized from the 
auction sale of the livestock less a commission of $7.00 per head 
sold. All of the twelve (12) checks bore William C. Erickson as the 
sole payee thereon. No funds were paid over to CSB at any time 
(Finding of Fact 9; Record on Appeal at 158; Trial Exhibit P-5); 
c). In the livestock industryf the fair market value of 
livestock is what the livestock will bring at sale at any particular 
time in a regular market therefore and the Smithfield Livestock 
Auction is a regular market for livestock such that its sale of the 
Erickson livestock would reflect the fair market value of the same 
at the time and place of sale (Finding of Fact 19; Record on Appeal 
at 162-163). Therefore, CSB established the fair market value of 
the property at the time and place of conversion. 
As argued under Point I above, the trial court granted the 
defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict on the basis that the 
endorsement on the back of the Smithfield checks to William C. 
Erickson (the sole payee), all of which were deposited for 
collection to CSB, put CSB on constructive notice of the livestock 
sale, and as CSB failed to set off against the account or otherwise 
act, it acquiesced in the sale and waived it conversion claim. 
"Whether or not there is a waiver or release of a cause of 
action is a matter which hinges on the intention of the parties 
involved." Hills Bank & Trust Co. v. Arnold Cattle Co., SttprSr at 
672. For purposes of a directed verdict motion or otherwise, the 
only evidence that the trial court had before it at the time it 
granted the motion is that the Bank did not intend to waive any 
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claims by accepting the checks for deposit and collection (this 
position is also legally as well as factually untenable under the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code as argued under Point III below). 
Therefore, the trial court viewed the evidence in a light most 
unfavorable to CSB in granting the defense motion, Clearly, at that 
stage of the proceedingsf reasonable minds could differ on the facts 
giving rise to the waiver issue such that the motion should have 
been denied and Smithfield should have been required to present its 
case in defense with an opportunity for rebuttal being afforded to 
CSB. 
The Court improperly weighed the evidence in ruling on the 
Motionf and sought to determine the preponderance thereof at that 
stage of the trial. The Court's opening remarks upon ruling on the 
Motion indicated the weighing process: " . . . in connection with the 
Motion, I see some validity to that and in several areasf some of 
which have less validity than others." (Transcript of Trial at 
105). The Court thereafter proceeded to weigh and analyze the 
evidence at some lengthf ultimately ruling on the endorsement/waiver 
theory. 
Had the trial court construed the evidence in the light most 
favorable to CSB and afforded CSB the benefit of all reasonable 
inference to be drawn therefrom, Smithfield1s Motion for Directed 
Verdict should have been denied. However, the trial court viewed 
the evidence in the light most unfavorable to CSB. Therefore, the 
order granting the Motion for Directed Verdict should be reversed 
and the case remanded to the District Court for a full trial on the 
merits. 
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POINT III 
A LIVESTOCK AUCTIONEER IS LIABLE TO A SECURED PARTY FOR 
CONVERSION OF THE SECURED PROPERTY WHEN THE AUCTIONEER SELLS 
THE SECURED PROPERTY WITHOUT REMITTING THE PROCEEDS TO THE 
SECURED PARTY UNLESS ACQUIESCENCE OR WAIVER OF THE SECURED 
PARTY IS SHOWN. 
Unfortunatelyf the trial Court failed to make a clear 
conclusion or finding as to whether Smithfield would have been 
liable in conversion to CSB but for the waiver and estoppel the 
court found based upon the endorsement on the Smithfield checks. 
Howeverf the Court made sufficient findings and conclusions in the 
record which indicate that Smithfield was clearly liable in 
conversion to CSB. The issue of whether that liability was estopped 
or waived is treated at Point IV herein. 
Initiallyf the Court entered the Conclusion of Law that 
"plaintiff's predecessor in interest. Bear River State Bankf held 
and possessed a valid security interest in and to all livestock of 
William C. Erickson and Susan S. Erickson owned or acquired after 
the date of their security agreement, June 8f 1982f the same which 
was duly perfected by a U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement filing with the 
office of the Secretary of State, State of Utah, on June 23, 1982." 
(Conclusion of Law No. 1, Record on Appeal at 162). 
Additionally, the Court made the Finding of Fact that 
"between the dates of June 15, 1982 and October 14, 1982, inclusive, 
Ericksons consigned certain livestock for sale to defendant 
Smithfield Livestock Auction. Said sales were conducted on twelve 
(12) separate occasions and following each sale, the defendant 
issued to Erickson its check representing the gross amount of the 
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proceeds realized from the auction of the livestock on that 
particular occasion less a commission of $7.00 per head sold. All 
of said twelve (12) checks were issued by the defendant to Erickson 
with William C. Erickson as the sole payee thereon and all were 
deposited for collection to the Erickson checking account at Bear 
River State Bank by Erickson . . . " (Finding of Fact No. 10; Record 
on Appeal at 159-160). 
Several cases consisting of identical facts to those of the 
instant case have consistently held that where a livestock auction 
sells consigned livestock in which the plaintiff holds a perfected 
security interestf the livestock auction is liable to the secured 
party for conversion of the secured property unless facts creating 
waiver or release or consent by the secured party are shown. 
in mils Pc*nk end Trust Company vs. Arnold Cflttlg cpmpanyr 
316 N.E. 2d 669 (111. 1974)
 f the court held, citing to 96 ALR 2d 
210f as follows: 
The great weight of authority follows the rule that sale of 
an auctioneer for a principal who has no title to the 
property or who holds it subject to a mortgage or other lien 
or who for other reasons has no right to dispose of it 
entails liability to the conversion on that part of the 
auctioneer who sells it under such circumstancesf pays over 
the proceeds to the principalr and hands the property over to 
the purchaser with a view to passing the title to him not 
withstanding the auctioneer's lack of knowledge of the 
principal's lack of authority to sell. 316 N.E. 2d at 371. 
It is interesting to note in the Hills Bank and Trust case 
that the court allowed the action for conversion to lie against the 
auctioneer and in favor of the plaintiff bank even though the 
plaintiff had released its chattel mortgages. 316 N.E. 2d at 371• 
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In the case of Farmers State Bank vs. w. M. Stewart, et. al.. 
454 S.W. 2d 908 (Mo. 1970), the court upheld an action for 
conversion against a livestock auction where the borrowers consigned 
the livestock to the auction for sale when the bank had a superior 
security interest in the livestock. The court in Farmers State Bank 
further found that the livestock auction was liable for the value of 
the livestock in conversion even though it was not on actual, but 
rather constructive notice of the plaintiff's security interest in 
the livestock. The Farmers State Bank case left no doubt that the 
recording of a financing statement or chattel mortgage constitutes 
notice of the contents thereof to all the world such that the 
livestock auction has constructive notice that the stock owner and 
borrower has no right to sell the livestock when presented for that 
purpose. 454 S.W. 2d at 915. 
Several other cases involving livestock auctions under 
identical circumstances such as those found in the instant case have 
uniformly held that the livestock auction is liable to the secured 
party in conversion and must turn the funds over to the secured 
party or pay the market value of the collateral at the time and 
place of conversion. .fige., e.g.. United States vs. Gallatin 
Livestock Auction. 448 F. Supp. 616 (W.D. Mo. 1978); nnited States 
of America vs. Topeka Livestock Auction. Inc.. 392 F. Supp. 944 
(N.D. Ind. 1975); United States of America vs. Squires. 370 F. Supp. 
798 (S.D. Iowa 1974); and State Securities Company vs. Norfolk 
Livestock Sales Company. Inc.. 187 Neb. 446, 191 N.W. 2d 614 (Neb. 
1971) . 
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As in all cases where the tort of conversion is allegedf the 
measure of damages in a conversion action of this type is the fair 
market value of the property at the time the conversion took place 
rather than the amount retained by the converter. United States vs. 
TQpeka Livestock Auctionr inctr XJL. at 948. 
Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Court failed to 
made a clear and concise finding that Smithfield would have been 
liable in conversion to the plaintiff but for the waiver and 
estoppel found by the Court, it is clear that the Court made 
sufficient Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law presenting all of 
the elements necessary to sustain a cause of action for conversion 
in this case. 
The next issue is one of whether CSB was subject to the 
endorsement instructions on the checks, or on notice thereof in any 
form, thereby creating the waiver and estoppel defenses against the 
conversion claim which the Court held were total defenses thereto. 
That issue will be treated on the next point below. 
POINT IV 
A COLLECTING BANK IS NEITHER GIVEN NOTICE NOR OTHERWISE 
AFFECTED BY A RESTRICTIVE ENDORSEMENT OF ANY PERSON EXCEPT 
THE BANK'S IMMEDIATE TRANSFEROR. 
One of the great favors which the Uniform Commercial Code did 
for financial institutions was to exempt them from any 
responsibility for restrictive endorsements or endorsement 
instructions given by any party in the check deposit and collection 
process except for the bank's customerf referred to in the Code as 
"the bank's immediate transferor". The drafters of the Uniform 
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Commercial Code provided this exemption to banks as they realized 
the practicalities and logistics involved in the check deposit and 
collection process. "Banks ordinarily handle instrumentsf 
especially checksf in bulkf and have no practicable opportunity to 
consider the effect of restrictive endorsements." Official Comment 
3 to Section 3-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code. These exemptions 
in favor banks from such endorsements are "for the purpose of 
permitting items to move rapidly through banking channels . . . " 
Official Comment Number 2 to Section 4-205 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code. See 33,59 6 Banking Law. Section 115.15 (2)
 f Matthew Bender 
and Companyf 1986. 
Initiallyf in this circumstancef CSB (which was at the time 
Bear River State Bank) is what is known as the "collecting bank". 
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 70A-4-105 (d) states that a collecting bank 
"means any bank handling the item for collection except the payor 
bank." Subsection (b) of that statute defines "payor bank" to mean 
"a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or accepted (the drawee 
bank or the bank upon which the check is drawn)." In the instant 
casef Judge Christoffersen ruled that in this circumstance that CSB 
was the "collecting bank". (Transcript of Trial, Page 108f Line 20; 
Conclusion of Law No. 5; Record on Appeal at 163-164) . The question 
becomes one of what effect restrictive endorsements and/or 
endorsement instructions have on a "collecting bank" when applied to 
the instrument by a party other than the Bank's immediate 
transferor. 
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First, CSB contends that the language on the reverse side of 
the Smithfield Livestock Auction checks is not a "restrictive 
endorsement" as defined by the Codef but rather is what is known as 
"endorsement instructions". The term "restrictive endorsement" is 
defined by the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-3-205 as one that is 
"(a) conditional; or, (b) purports to prohibit further transfer of 
the instrument; or (c) includes the words 'for collection1, 'for 
deposit', 'pay any bank', or like term signifying a purpose of 
deposit or collection; or (d) otherwise states that it is for the 
benefit or use of the endorser or of another person." 
The purpose of Section 70A-3-205 of the Code is to provide a 
definition of restrictive endorsements which will include the 
varieties of endorsements described in the original Sections 36 and 
39 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act. Official Comment 1 to 
Uniform Commercial Code Section 3-205. The endorsement provided on 
the reverse side of Smithfield checks is not conditional nor does it 
prohibit further transfer of the instrument nor does it include 
words like "for collection", "for deposit only", "pay any bank" or 
like terms signifying a purpose of deposit or collection. The 
endorsement is merely a warranty given by the consignor of cattle to 
Smithfield (and hence the payee on the checks) that the cattle 
submitted were sold free of mortgages. Unquestionably, William C. 
Erickson as payee breached that warranty to Smithfield; however, a 
warranty, as is the case with lien waiver language, is not a 
restrictive endorsement. 
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It is especially interesting to note, given the defenses 
raised by Smithfield that a livestock auction would be subject to 
the lien of the bank as would the subsequent purchaser of the cattle 
in this particular case in any event. UTAH CODE ANN. 70A-9-307 
states that Ma buyer in the ordinary course of business other than a 
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming 
operations takes free of a security interest created by his seller 
even though the security interest is perfected and even though the 
buyer knows of its existence (emphasis added)." The drafters of the 
Code made a specific and clear exception to the ordinary course of 
business rule where one buys farm products from a person engaged in 
farming operations. Thereforef in this case, in spite of the 
endorsement instructionsf the lien in favor of CSB follows the 
livestock through the hands of all purchasers and consignees. The 
Code affords a high degree of protection to lienholders of farm 
products by specifically excepting buyers of farm products obtaining 
farm products from one engaged in farming operations from the 
bonafide purchaser protections afforded to other purchasers of other 
types of goods under the Code. 
UTAH CODE ANN. Section 70A-4-203 clearly exempts CSB from any 
notice or responsibility arising by virtue of the endorsement 
instructions on the reverse side of the Smithfield Livestock Auction 
checks and its terms further point up the manifest error in the 
application of the law made by the trial Court. That Section states 
in full text as follows: 
"Subject to the provisions of Article 3 concerning conversion 
of instruments (Section 3-419) and the provisions of both 
Article 3 and this article concerning restrictive 
endorsements, only a collecting bank's transferor can give 
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instructions which affect the bank or constitute notice to it 
and a collecting bank is not liable to prior parties for any 
action taken pursuant to such instructions or in accordance 
with any agreement with its transferor." (emphasis added). 
The warranty endorsement instructions on the Smithfield 
checks constitutes an agreement between Smithfield and CSB's 
transferror/ William C. Erickson; that type of agreement has no 
effect on the collecting bank pursuant to the provisions of Section 
4-203. 
It is interesting in the Trial Transcript that the trial 
Courtf when confronted with the application of Section 70A-4-203 to 
its ruling in the casef could only attempt to carve out an exception 
to the provisions of the Section which finds no authority in the 
language of the statute. Commencing at Page 109f Line 18 of the 
Trial Transcript/ the dialogue between plaintiff's counsel and the 
Court proceeded as follows: 
MR. SHIELDS: Your Honorf if I may inquire briefly, what 
is the Court's interpretation of the Section 4-203? That is 
the question I have. 
THE COURT: Section which one? 
MR. DAINES: I'll give it to the Court if the Court wants 
to see it. It's right here Your Honor, 4-203. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think this has any effect on what 
I'm saying as to the restrictive endorsement as to it just 
being a collecting bank. . . . if they were a collecting bank 
who didn't have a mortgage on these cattle, I don't think 
that it would — I think then 70A-4-203 would apply . . . " 
This exception analysis was further defined commencing at 
Page lllr Line 22 of the Trial Transcript when the dialogue 
proceeded as follows: 
MR. SHIELDS: So the court is carving out an exception to 
4-203 if there is a collecting bank — 
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THE COURT: A particular set of circumstances. 
In shortf the Court held that there would be no waiver and 
presumably liability in conversion of Smithfield to CSB if CSB had 
been just a collecting bank of the checks in question; however, the 
Court is making an exception that when there is a collecting bank 
which is also a mortgagee of collateral that the protections of 
Section 4-203 do not apply. This exception finds no basis in the 
language of the statute as no common sense construction can be made 
to bootstrap that exception into it. Furtherr the exception is 
entirely illogical in view of the reasons for Section 4-203 being 
included in the Code. As cited above, the protections afforded to 
collecting banks against endorsement instructions and restrictive 
endorsements were extended to banks in order to speed the deposit 
and collection process and recognizing the logistical problem that 
banks have so many checks to deal with on a daily basis that they 
have no practicable opportunity to examine restrictive endorsements 
and endorsement instructions. The fact that a bank is also a 
mortgagee of collateral would in no way serve to reduce the number 
of checks that are being processed or to make it more practicable 
for a bank to examine the endorsements which may be on checks that 
it takes in for collection. 
In Swiss Baco Skyline Logging. Inc. vs. Haliewicz. et. alw 
567 P. 2d 1141 (Wash. 1977) , the Court of Appeals of Washington 
applied the provisions of Section 4-203 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (the Washington and Utah versions of 4-203 are identical) to 
affirm a summary judgment in favor of defendant Bank of California 
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against a claim of plaintiff that the Bank negotiated a check over a 
notice of claim against the check. 
In April and August of 1973f plaintiff Swiss Bacof through 
its then President, Emil Haliewicz, purchased two U.S. Forest 
Service contractsf known as the Calasit and Sitkum contracts. On 
October 31, 1973/ Haliewicz resigned as President/ continued 
thereafter to negotiate for sale of both contracts/ and was 
expressly authorized by the corporation to negotiate for the sale of 
the Calasit contract only. Howeverf Swiss Baco claimed it was not 
aware of Haliewicz's efforts on the Sitkum contract until shortly 
prior to filing the lawsuit. 567 P. 2d at 1144. 
In the course of negotiations/ Haliewicz came in contact with 
one William Bellmf principal of General Log and Timber/ whof in 
December 1973/ took primary responsibility as broker in the proposed 
sale of the two timber contracts to West Coast Orient Timber Co. 
The negotiations culminated in an agreement in which West Coast 
Orient agreed to pay a cash advance of $250/000.00 on the Calasit 
contract and $85/000.00 on the Sitkum contract. West Coast Orient 
then proceeded to transfer the cash advance in accordance with 
instructions from Bellm and Haliewicz. It was agreed that West 
Coast Orient would wire the funds to Bellm1s bank/ Bank of 
California. When the wired funds arrived/ Bellm and Haliewicz went 
to Bank of California and instructed a bank officer to disburse a 
portion of the funds in certain cashier's checks; one check/ for 
$80/000.00 was made payable to Haliewicz personally. Swiss Baco 
sued Bank of California contending that it breached a duty to Swiss 
Baco to exercise due care in the deposit and disbursement of the 
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funds and by breaching that dutyf is subject to liability for 
negligence. Id. 
The duty claim arose based on wire transfer instructions from 
Bank of California's San Francisco branch (where West Coast Orient's 
bank originally wired the funds) to its Seattle branch (where Bellm 
had his account), which stated as follows: 
M
. . . WE CREDIT YOU 348,000 
ATTN ROBERT JASPER FOR 
ACCT GENERAL LOG AND 
TIMBER CO AND SWISS BACO 
SKYLINE LOGGING . . . BY 
ORDER WEST COAST ORIENT . . . " 
In concluding that Bank of California had no obligation or 
duty to Swiss Bacof the Court held: 
A bank does owe a duty to its "customers" to use due care 
in the issuance and payment of checks on customers' accounts. 
Swiss Baco, however, was not a "customer" of the Bank of 
California, because it did not have an account with the 
defendant bank nor did the Bank of California agree "to 
collect items" for Swiss Baco. 
62-A 4-104 (1)(e) defines Customer" as any person having 
an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to 
collect items . . . 
Because Swiss Baco was neither customer, payee, nor 
endorser, the defendant Bank of California owed it no duty. 
Under RCW 62A 4-203, the Bank of California was entitled 
to rely on the instructions given to it by its immediate 
advising bank. We have before us only the interbranch credit 
wire which directed the credit to a specific account. Normal 
banking procedures dictate that, in carrying out those 
instructions, the specific number of the account contained on 
the credit instructions determines the account to which the 
funds must be credited. The added fact that Haliewicz 
participated in directing the disposition of those proceeds 
is immaterial as far as the Bank of California is concerned 
so long as it followed its customer's orders. The trial 
Court properly granted summary judgment for the defendant 
Bank of California. 567 P. 2d at 1146. 
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The Court's decision in the instant case has imposed upon CSB 
the duty to monitor and enforce the warranty of William C. Erickson 
to Smithfield that the cattle were not subject to a lien or that 
Erickson would have the lien released; this notwithstanding that the 
Smithfield Livestock Auction was not at any time relevant hereto a 
customer of CSB. The instructions of CSB's customer, William C. 
Erickson, to CSB came in the form of Erickson1s deposit slips 
instructing CSB to collect the checks to Erickson1s account; this 
CSB did, thereby discharging the full tenor of its duty to all 
parties concerned. 
The Court's decision is clearly in contravention of 
unambiguous statutory provisions directly on point to the subject 
matter of the case and, in any event, defies any reasonable logic or 
interpretation that could be applied to the facts of this case or to 
the provisions of the statute. The trial Court took incredible 
liberties with the law and the facts of this case to render a 
decision in favor of the defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the arguments above that the trial court's 
judgment of dismissal, no cause of action, was both procedurally and 
substantively defective. As a procedural matter, the trial court 
granted Smithfield's Motion for Directed Verdict improperly as it 
failed to view the evidence presented in CSB's case-in-chief in the 
light most favorable to CSB and undertook to weigh and determine the 
preponderance of the evidence at that stage of the trial; this 
notwithstanding that CSB established a prima facie case of 
conversion. As a substantive matter, the trial court erroneously 
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ruled that CSB was subject to endorsement instructions upon 
instruments to which CSB was not a party. The authority argued to 
the Court which fully supports CSB's position. CSB respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the judgment of the trial court, 
determine that CSB did not waive its claim for conversion against 
Smithfield by virtue of being subject to the endorsement on the back 
of the Smithfield checks, determine that Smithfield is liable in 
conversion to CSBf and remanding the case to the District Court for 
entry of judgment consistent with such opinion of this Court. 
DATED this _ day of Februaryf 1987. 
Respectfully submittedf 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
-V4^£^ 
^l§f£j>eypfy^t o n S h i e l ds 
Ass i s tant General Counsel 
Attorney for Appellant 
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protest; a n d 
(e) notifying its transferor of any loss or delay 
in transit within a reasonable time after discovery 
thereof. 
(2) A collecting bank taking proper action before 
its midnight deadline following receipt of an item, 
notice or payment acts seasonably; taking proper 
action within a reasonably longer time may be sea* 
sonable but the bank has the burden of so establis-
hing. 
(3) Subject to subsection (1)00. a bank is not 
liable for the insolvency, neglect, misconduct, 
mistake or default of another bank or person or for 
loss or destruction of an item in transit or in the 
possession nf others* _ ^ - —^^ I N S 
70A-4-203. Effect of instructions. 
/ Subject to the provisions of chapter 3 concerning 
(conversion of instruments (section 70A-3-419) 
land the. provisions of both chapter 3 and this 
/chapter concerning restrictive indorsements only a 
collecting bank's transferor can give instructions 
which affect the bank or constitute notice to it and 
a collecting bank is not liable to prior parties for 
any action taken pursuant to such instructions or in 
accordance with any agreement with its transferor. 
\ t O A ^ W T M e t h o d s of senoHig and Uicsentfng 
Sending direct to payor bank. 
(1) A collecting bank must send items by reason-
ably prompt method taking into consideration any 
relevant instructions, the nature of the item, the 
number of such items on hand, and the cost of 
collection involved and the method generally used 
by it or others to present such items. 
(2) A collecting bank may send 
(a) any item direct to the payor bank; 
(b) any item to any nonbank payor if author-
ized by its transferor; and 
(c) any item other than documentary drafts to 
a n y nonbank payor, if authorized by Federal 
Reserve regulation or operating letter, clearinghouse 
rule or the like. 
(3) Presentment may be made by a presenting 
bank at a place where the payor bank has requested 
that presentment be made. INS 
70A-4-205. Supplying missing indorsement • No 
notice from prior indorsement. 
(1) A depositary bank which has taken an item 
for collection may supply any indorsement of the 
customer which is necessary to title unless the item 
contains the words "payee's indorsement required" 
or the like. In the absence of such a requirement a 
statement placed on the item by the depositary bank 
to the effect that the item was deposited by a cust-
omer or credited to his account is effective as the 
customer's indorsement. 
(2) An intermediary bank, or payor bank which is 
not a depositary bank, is neither given notice nor 
otherwise affected by a restrictive indorsement of 
any person except the bank's immediate transferor. 
70A-4-206. Transfer between banks. 
Any agreed method which identifies the transferor 
bank is sufficient for the item's further transfer to 
another bank. 1963 
1965 
70A-4-207. Warranties of customer and collecting 
bank on transfer or presentment of items - Time 
for claims. 
(1) Each customer or collecting bank who obtains 
payment or acceptance of an item and each prior 
customer and collecting bank warrants to the payor 
bank or other payor who in good faith pays or 
accepts the item that 
(a) he has a good title to the item or is author-
ized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of 
one who has a good title; and 
(b) he has no knowledge that the signature of 
the maker or drawer is unauthorized, except that 
this warranty is not given by any customer or coll-
ecting bank that is a holder in due course and acts 
in good faith. 
(i) to a maker with respect to the maker's 
own signature; or 
(ii) to a drawer with respect to the drawer's 
own signature, whether or not the drawer is also the 
drawee; or 
(iii) to an acceptor of an item if the holder in 
due course took the item after the acceptance or 
obtained the acceptance without knowledge that the 
L drawer's signature was unauthorized; and 
| \ (c) the item has not been materially altered, 
W e p t that this warranty is not given by any cust-
omer or collecting bank that is a holder in due 
cpurse and acts in good faith 
| (i) to the maker of a note; or 
(ii) to the drawer of a draft whether or not 
the drawer is also the drawee; or 
(iii) to the acceptor of an item with respect to 
alteration made prior to the acceptance if the 
holder in due course took the item after the accep-
tance, even though the acceptance provided 
"payable as originally drawn" or equivalent terms; 
or 
(iv) to the acceptor of an item with respect to 
an alteration made after the acceptance. 
(2) Each customer and collecting bank who tran-
sfers an item and receives a settlement or other 
consideration for it warrants to his transferee and to 
any subsequent collecting bank who takes the item 
in good faith that 
(a) he has a good title to the item or is author-
ized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of 
one who has a good title and the transfer is other-
wise rightful; and 
(b) all signatures are genuine or authorized; and 
(c) the item has not been materially altered; and 
(d) no defense of any party is good against him; 
and 
(e) he has no knowledge of any insolvency 
proceeding instituted with respect to the maker or 
acceptor or the drawer of an unaccepted item. In 
addition each customer and collecting bank so tra-
nsferring an item and receiving a settlement or other 
consideration engages that upon dishonor and any 
necessary notice of dishonor and protest he will take 
up the item. 
(3) The warranties and the engagement to honor 
set forth in the two preceding subsections arise 
notwithstanding the absence of indorsement or 
words of guaranty or warranty in the transfer or 
presentment and a collecting bank remains liable for 
their breach despite remittance to its transferor. 
Damages for breach of such warranties or engage-
ment to honor shall not exceed the consideration 
received by the customer or collecting bank respo-
nsible plus finance charges and expenses related to 
the item, if any. 
(4) Unless a claim for breach of warranty under 
this section is made within a reasonable time after 
the person claiming learns of the breach, the person 
liable is discharged to the extent of any loss caused 
by the delay in making claim. i9*s 
70A-4-208. Security interest of collecting bank in 
Items, accompanying documents and proceeds. 
(1) A bank has a security interest in an i:em and 
rs 
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tion applicable throughout this chapter. i%5 
70A-4-105. "Depositary bank" - "Intermediary 
bank" - "Collecting bank" - "Payor bank" -
"Presenting bank" - "Remitting bank." 
In this chapter unless the context otherwise requ-
ires: 
(a) "Depositary bank" means the first bank to 
which an item is transferred for collection even 
though ii is also the payor bank; 
(b) "Payor bank" means a bank by which an item 
is payable as drawn or accepted; 
(c) "Intermediary bank" means any bank to which 
an item is transferred in course of collection except 
the depositary or payor bank; 
(d) "Collecting bank" means any bank handling 
the item for collection except the payor bank; 
(e) "Presenting bank" means any bank presenting 
an item except a payor bank; 
(0 "Remitting bank" means any payor or inter-
mediary bank remitting for an item. i%5 
70A-4-106. Separate office of a bank. 
A branch or separate office of a bank is a sepa-
rate bank for the purpose of computing the time 
within which and determining the place at or to 
which action may be taken or notices or orders shall 
be given under this chapter and under chapter 3. 1965 
70A-4-107. Time of receipt of items. 
(1) For the purpose of allowing time to process 
items, prove balances and make the necessary entries 
on the books to determine its position for the day, a 
bank may fix an afternoon hour of two p.m. or 
later as a cutoff hour for the handling of money 
and items and the making of entries on its books. 
<2) Any Item or deposit of money received on any 
day after a cutoff hour so fixed or after the close of 
the banking day may be treated as being received at 
the opening of the next banking day. i**s 
70A-4-108. Delays. 
(1) Unless otherwise instructed, a collecting bank 
in a good faith effort to secure payment may, in the 
case of specific items and with or without the app-
roval of any person involved, waive, modify or 
extend time limits imposed or permitted by this act 
for a period not in excess of an additional banking 
day without discharge of secondary parties and 
without liability to its transferor or any prior party. 
(2) Delay by a collecting bank or payor bank 
beyond time limits prescribed or permitted by this 
act or by instructions is excused if caused by inter-
ruption of communication facilites, suspension of 
payments by another bank, war, emergency condit-
ions or other circumstances beyond the control of 
the bank provided it exercises such diligence as the 
circumstances require. i%5 
70A-4-109. Process of posting. 
The "process of posting" means the usual proce-
dure followed by a payor bank in determining to 
pay an item and in recording the payment including 
one or more of the following or other steps as det-
ermined by the bank: 
(a) verification of any signature; 
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available; 
(c) affixing a 'paid* or other stamp; 
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's 
account; 
(e) correcting or reversing an entry or erroneous 
action with respect to the item. tws 
Part 2. Collection of Items - Depositary and 
Collecting Banks 
?iA-4-201.1 
of collecting banks and provisional status of credits -
Applicability of chapter - Item indorsed "pay any 
bank." 
70A-4-202. Responsiblity for collection • When action 
seasonable. 
70A-4-203. Effect of instructions. 
70A-4-204. Methods of sending and presenting • 
Sending direct to payor bank. 
70A-4-205. Supplying missing indorsement - No notice 
from prior indorsement. 
70A-4-206. Transfer between banks. 
70A-4-207. Warranties of customer and collecting bank 
on transfer or presentment of items - Time for claims. 
70A-4-208. Security interest of collecting bank in items, 
accompanying documents and proceeds. 
,70A-4-209. When bank gives value for purposes of 
• holder in due course. 
70A-4-210. Presentment by notice of item not payable 
by, through or at a bank - Liability of secondary 
parties. 
70A-4-211. Media of remittance - Provisional and final 
settlement in remittance cases. 
70A-4-212. Right of charge-back or refund. 
70A-4-213. Final payment of item by payor bank -
When provisional debits and credits become final -
When certain credits become available for withdrawal. 
70A-4-214. Insolvency and prefereoce. 
70A-4-201. Presumption and duration of agency 
status of collecting banks and provisional status 
of credits - Applicability of chapter - Item 
indorsed "pay any bank." . 
(1) Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and 
prior to the time that a settlement given by a colle-
cting bank for an. item is or becomes fin " 
(subsection (3) of section 70A-4-211 and sections 
70A-4-212 and 70A-4-213) the bank is an 
agent or subagent of the owner of the item and any 
settlement given for the item is provisional. This 
provision applies regardless of the form of indorse-
ment or lack of indorsement and even though credit 
given for the item is subject to immediate withdr-
awal as of right or is in fact withdrawn; but the 
continuance of ownership of an item by its owner^ 
and any rights of the owner to proceeds of the item 
are subject to rights of a collecting bank such afcv 
those resulting from outstanding advances on the . 
item and valid rights of setoff. When an item b 
handled by banks for purposes of presentment, 
payment and collection, the relevant provisions of 
this chapter apply even though action of parties 
clearly establishes that a particular bank has purc-
hased the item and is the owner of it. 
(2) After an item has been indorsed with the 
words "pay any bank" or the like, only a bank may 
acquire the rights of a holder '_ 
(a) until the item has been returned to the cus-' * 
tomer initiating collection; or 'rtfcjS^ 
(b) until the item has been specially indorsed by' 
a bank to a person who is not a bank. mi 
70A-4-202. Responsiblity for collection - When 
action seasonable. ."_.*'' 
(1) A collecting bank must use ordinary care in
 4-
(a) presenting an item or sending it for preset^ 
tment;and , \% 
(b) sending notice of dishonor or nonpayment, 
or returning an item other than a documentary draty* 
to the bank's transferor or directly.to the depositary
 t 
bank under subsection (2) of section 70A-4-21Z, 
after learning that the item has not been 
accepted, as the case may be; and 1: ^ ^ 1 ^ . ^ 
(c) settling for an item when the bank, 
final settlement; and -'"'**•-• * * A 
(d) making or providing for +-j£*i 
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( 0 UnJess otherwise specified consent to extension 
authorizes a single extension for not longer than the 
original period. A consent to extension, expressed in 
the ins t rument , is binding on secondary parties and 
accommoda t ion makers . A holder may not exercise 
his opt ion to extend an instrument over the objec-
tion of a maker o r acceptor or other par ty who in 
accordance with section 70A-3-604 tenders full 
payment when the instrument is due . 1965 
70A-3-119. Other writings affecting instrument. 
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate 
obligee o r any transferee the terms of an instrument 
may be modified or affected by any other written 
agreement executed as a part of the same transac-
t ion, except that a holder in due course is not affe-
cted by any limitation of his rights arising out of the 
separate written agreement if he had no notice of 
the limitation when he took the instrument. 
(2) A separate agreement does not affect the 
negotiability o f an instrument. 1965 
70A-3-120. Instruments "payable through" bank. 
An instrument which states that it is "payable 
through" a bank or the like designates that bank as 
a collecting bank to make presentment but does not 
o f itself authorize the bank to pay the instrument. 
70A-3-121. Instruments payable at bank. 
A note or acceptance which states that it is 
payable at a bank is not o f itself an order or auth-
orization to the bank to pay it. IMS 
70A-3-122. Accrual of cause of action. 
(1) A cause o f action against a maker or an acc-
eptor accrues 
(a) in the case o f a time instrument on the day 
after maturity; 
(b) in the case o f a demand instrument upon its 
date or, if no date is stated, on the date o f issue. 
• •: (2) A cause o f action against the obligor o f a 
demand or time certificate o f deposit accrues upon 
demand, but demand o n a time certificate may not 
be made until on or after the date o f maturity. 
(3) A cause o f action against a drawer of a draft 
or an indorser of any instrument accrues upon 
demand following dishonor o f the instrument. 
Notice o f dishonor is a demand. 
(4) Unless an instrument provides otherwise, int-
erest runs at the rate provided by law for a judg-
ment 
(a) in the case o f a maker, acceptor or other 
primary obligor o f a demand instrument, from the 
date o f demand; 
(b) in all other cases from the date of accrual of 
the cause of action. IMS 
Part 2 . Transfer and Negotiation 
70A-3-201. Transfer - Right to indorsement. 
70A-J-202. Negotiation. 
70A-J-203. Wrong or misspelled name. 
70A-3-204. Special indorsement - Blank indorsement. 
70A-3-205. Restrictive indorsements. 
70A-3-2O6. Effect of restrictive indorsement. 
70A-3-2O7. Negotiation effective although it may be 
.TtvUMftf. 
** *!• --I ." . . . 
T 0 A 4 - 2 9 1 . Transfer - Right to indorsement. 
(1) Transfer o f an instrument vests in the transf-
eree such rights as the transferor has therein, except 
that a transferee who has himself been a party to 
any fraud or illegality affecting the instrument or 
who as a prior holder h a d notice o f a defense or 
d a i m against it cannot improve his position by 
taking from a later holder in due course. 
(2) A transfer of a security interest in an instru-
ment vests the foregoing rights in the transferee to 
the extent of the interest transferred. 
(3) Unless otherwise agreed any transfer for value 
of an instrument not then payable to bearer gives 
the transferee the specifically enforceable right to 
have the unqualified indorsement of the transferor. 
Negotiation takes effect only when the endorsement 
is made and until that time there is no presumption 
that the transferee is the owner. i%s 
70A-3-202. Negotiation. 
(1) Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in 
such form that the transferee becomes a holder. If 
the instrument is payable to order it is negotiated by 
delivery with any necessary indorsement; if payable 
to bearer it is negotiated by delivery. 
(2) An indorsement must be written by or on 
behalf of the holder and on the instrument or on a 
paper so firmly affixed thereto as to become a part 
thereof. 
(3) An indorsement is effective for negotiation 
only when it conveys the entire instrument or any 
unpaid residue. If it purports to be o f less it oper-
ates only as a partial assignment. 
(4) Words o f assignment, condition, waiver, 
guaranty, limitation or disclaimer o f liability a n d the 
like accompanying an indorsement d o not affect its 
character as an indorsement. M s 
70A-3-203. Wrong or misspelled name. 
Where an instrument is made payable to a person 
under a misspelled name or one other than his own 
he may indorse in that name or his own or both; 
but signature in both names may be required by a 
person paying or giving value for the instrument.. 1*5 
70A-3-204. Special indorsement - Blank •>•*. 
indorsement. •"' *> '* ±i+ <-•> Crx 
(1) A special indorsement specifies the-person to 
whom or to whose order it makes the instrument 
payable. Any instrument specially indorsed becomes 
payable to the order of the special indorsee and may 
be further negotiated only by his indorsement* 
(2) A n indorsement in blank specifies n o partic-
ular indorsee and may consist of a mere signature. 
An instrument payable to order and indorsed in 
blank becomes payable to bearer and may- be nego-
tiated by delivery alone until specially indorsed.' 
(3) The holder may convert a blarik indorsement 
into a special indorsement by writing over the sign-
ature of the indorser in blank any contract consis-
tent with the character o f the indorsement. fc* itss 
70A-3-205. Restrictive indorsements. . . * 
An indorsement is restrictive which-either •'-
(a) is conditional; or - • " 
(b) purports to prohibit further transfer o f the 
instrument; or ' . - , » . , . . ' , 
(c) includes the words "for collection.'' , •for 
deposit," "pay any b a n k / or like terms signifying a 
purpose o f deposit or collection; or 
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit pr.use 
of the indorser or o f another person. '2- \ JI« ats .
-
70A-3-206. Effect o f restrictive iudommafel ^ « £ , • }? 
(1) N o restrictive indorsement prevent^ further *j& 
transfer or negotiation o f the ins trument .^ zi^^t '^' 
(2) A n intermediary bank, or a payor.bank whkfc
 r1 
is not the depositary bank, is neither given notice 
nor otherwise affected by a restrictive indorsement 
o f any person except the bank's inmiediate transf-
eror or the person presenting for payment. ? ' \ # 
(3) Except for an intermediary bank, any transf-
eree under an indorsement which is conditional or 
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urity interest may be otherwise perfected as provided 
in this chapter before or after the period of pos?es-
sion by the secured par ty . 1977 
70A-9-306. "Proceeds* - Secured party's rights 
on disposition of collateral. 
(1) "Proceeds* includes whatever is received upon 
the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of 
collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason 
of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds, 
except to the extent that it is payable to a person 
other than a party to the security agreement. 
Money, checks, deposit accounts and the like are 
"cash proceeds." All other proceeds are "noncash 
proceeds." 
(2) Except where this chapter otherwise provides, 
a security interest continues in collateral notwithst-
anding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof 
unless the disposition was authorized by the secured 
par ty in the security agreement or otherwise, and 
also continues in any identifiable proceeds including 
collections received by the debtor. 
(3) The security interest in proceeds is a cori) 
ously perfected security interest if the interest in the 
original collateral was perfected but it ceases to be a 
perfected security interest and becomes unperfected 
ten days after receipt o f the proceeds by the debtor 
unless 
(a) a filed financing statement covers the orig-
inal collateral and the proceeds are collateral in 
which a security interest may be perfected by filing 
in the office or offices where the financing state-
ment has been filed and, if the proceeds are acqu-
ired with cash proceeds, the description of collateral 
in the financing statement indicates the types of 
property constituting the proceeds; or 
(b) a filed financing statement covers the orig-
inal collateral and the proceeds are identifiable cash 
proceeds; or 
(c) the security interest in the proceeds is perf-
ected before the expiration of the ten-day period. 
Except as provided in this section, a security interest 
in proceeds can be perfected only by the methods or 
under the circumstances permitted in this chapter 
for original collateral of the same type. 
(4) In the event o f insolvency proceedings instit-
uted by or against a debtor, a secured party with a 
perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfe-
cted security interest only in the following proceeds: 
(a) in identifiable noncash proceeds and in 
separate deposit accounts containing only proceeds; 
(b) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of 
money which is neither commingled with other 
money nor deposited in a deposit account prior to 
the insolvency proceedings; 
(c) in identifiable cash proceeds in the form of 
checks and the like which are not deposited in a 
deposit account prior to the insolvency proceedings; 
and 
(d) in all cash and deposit accounts o f the 
debtor i n which proceeds have been commingled 
with other funds, but the perfected security interest 
under this paragraph (d) is 
(i) subject to any right of setoff; and 
(ii) limited to an amount not greater than the 
amount o f any cash proceeds received by the debtor 
within ten days before the institution o f the insolv-
ency proceedings less the turn o f (I) the payments to 
the secured party o n account o f cash proceeds rec-
eived by the debtor during such period and (II) the 
cash proceeds received b y the debtor during such 
period to which the secured party is entitled under 
paragraphs (a) through (c) o f this subsection (4). 
(5) If a sale of goods results in an account or 
chattel paper which is transferred by the seller to a 
secured party, and if the goods are returned to or 
are repossessed by the seller or the secured party, 
the following rules determine priorities: 
(a) If the goods were collateral at the time of 
sale for an indebtedness of the seller which is still 
unpaid, the original security interest attaches again 
to the goods and continues as a perfected security 
interest if it was perfected at the time when the 
goods were sold. If the security interest was origin-
ally perfected by a filing which is still effective, 
nothing further is required to continue the perfected 
status; in any other case, the secured party must 
take possession of the returned or repossessed goods 
or must file. 
(b) An unpaid transferee of the chattel paper 
has a security interest in the goods against the tra-
nsferor. Such security interest is prior to a security 
interest asserted under paragraph (a) to the extent 
hat the transferee of the chattel paper was entitled 
to priority under section 70A-9-308. 
(c) An unpaid transferee o f the account has a 
security interest in the goods against the transferor. 
Such security interest is subordinate to a security 
interest asserted under paragraph (a) . 
(d) A security interest of an unpaid transferee 
asserted under paragraph (b) or (c) must be perfe-
cted for protection against creditors of the transf-
eror and purchasers of the returned or repossessed 
goods. wn 
70A-9-307. Protection of buyers of goods. 
(1) A buyer in ordinary course o f business 
(Subsection (9) o f Section 70A-1-201) other than 
a person buying farm products from a person 
engaged in farming operations takes free of a secu-
rity interest created by his seller even though the 
security interest is perfected and even though the 
buyer knows of its existence. - , ^ t • 
(2) In the case o f consumer goods, a buyer takes 
free of a security interest even though perfected if 
he buys without knowledge of the security interest, 
for value and for his own personal, family or hou-
sehold purposes unless prior to the purchase the 
secured party has filed a financing statement cove-
ring such goods. 
(3) A buyer other than a buyer in ordinary course 
of business (Subsection (1) of this section) takes free 
of a security interest to the extent that it secures 
future advances made after the secured party acqu-
ires knowledge o f the purchase, or more than 45 
days after the purchase, whichever first occurs, 
unless made pursuant to a commitment entered into 
without knowledge o f the purchase and before the 
expiration of the 45-day period. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) of this section, 
a secured party may not enforce a security interest 
in farm products against a buyer, commission mer-
chant, or selling agent who purchases or sells farm 
products in the ordinary course of business from or 
for a person engaged in farming operations unless 
the secured party has complied with the rules issued 
by the director of the Division of Corporations and 
Commercial Code under authority granted by 
Section70A-9-400. v* v ~ ; ^ - '-** 
70A-M0S. Parcsaat of chattel 
A purchaser o f chattel paper o r an instrument 
who gives new value and takes possession o f it in 
the ordinary course o f his business ha s rjriority «>ver 
a security interest in the chattel paper or instrumefit: 
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indorsement does not of itself 
give notice to subsequent parties 
of any defense or claim of the 
indorser. Hence this section 
gives such an indorsement the 
same effect as an unrestricted in-
dorsement. 
3. Subsection (2) permits an 
intermediary bank (Sections 3— 
102(3) and 4—105) or a payor 
bank which is not a depositary 
bank (Sections 3—102(3) and 
4—105) to disregard any re-
strictive indorsement except that 
of the bank's immediate transfer-
or. Such banks ordinarily handle 
instruments, especially checks, in 
bulk and have no practicable op-
portunity to consider the effect 
of restrictive indorsements. Sub-
section (2) does not affect the 
rights of the restrictive indorser 
against parties outside the bank 
collection process or against the 
first bank in the collection proc-
ess ; such rights are governed by 
subsections (3) and (4) and Sec-
tion 3—603. 
4. Conditional indorsements 
are treated by this section like 
indorsements for deposit or col-
lection. Under subsection (3) 
any transferee under such an in-
dorsement except an interme-
diary bank becomes a holder for 
value to the extent that he acts 
consistently with the indorse-
ment in paying or applying any 
value given by him for or on the 
security of the instrument. 
Contrary to the original Section 
39, subsection (3) permits a 
transferee under a conditional in-
dorsement to become a holder in 
due course free of the condition-
al indorsees claim. 
5. Of the indorsements cover-
ed by this section those "for col-
lection", "for deposit" and "pay 
any bank" are overwhelmingly 
the most frequent. Indorsements 
"for collection" or "for deposit" 
may be either special or blank; 
indorsements "pay any bank" are 
governed by Section 4—201(2). 
Instruments so indorsed are al-
most invariably destined to be 
lodged in a bank for collection. 
Subsection (3) requires any 
transferee other than an inter-
mediary bank to act consistently 
with the purpose of collection, 
and Section 3—603 lays down a 
similar rule for payors not cov-
ered by subsection (2). 
6. Subsection (4), applying to 
trust indorsements other than 
those for deposit or collection 
(paragraph (d) of Section 3— 
205) is similar to subsection (3); 
but in subsection (4) the duty to 
act consistently with the indorse-
ment is limited to the first taker 
under it. If an instrument is in-
dorsed "Pay T in trust for B" or 
"Pay T for B" or "Pay T for ac-
count of B" or "Pay T as agent 
for B," whether B is the indorser 
or a third person, T is of course 
subject to liability for any breach 
of his obligation as fiduciary. 
But trustees commonly and legiti-
mately sell trust assets in trans-
actions entirely outside the bank 
collection process; the trustee 
therefore has power to negotiate 
the instrument and make his 
transferee a holder in due course. 
Whether transferees from T have 
notice of a breach of trust such 
as to deny them the status of 
holders in due course is governed 
by the section on notice to pur-
chasers (Section 3—304); the 
trust indorsement does not of it-
self give such notice. Payors are 
immunized either by subsection 
(2) of this section or by Section 
§ 4 — 2 0 4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
bank. [This paragraph was add-
ed in 1962]. 
Cross References: 
Sections 3—504, 4—501 and 4— 
502. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Collecting bank". Section 4— 
105. 
"Documentary draft". Section 
4—104. 
"Item". Section 4—104. 
"Payor bank". Section 4—105. 
"Presenting bank". Section 
4—105. 
<>r 
& 
§ 4 — 2 0 5 . Supplying Missing Indorsement; No Notice from 
Prior Indorsement 
(1) A depositary bank which has taken an item for collection 
may supply any indorsement of the customer which is necessary 
to title unless the item contains the words "payee's indorsement 
required" or the like. In the absence of such a requirement a 
statement placed on the item by the depositary bank to the effect 
that the item was deposited by a customer or credited to his ac-
count is effective as the customer's indorsement. 
(2) An intermediary bank, or payor bank which is not a de-
positary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected by 
a restrictive indorsement of any person except the bank's im-
mediate transferor. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: None. 
Purposes: 
1. Subsection (1) is designed 
to speed up collections by elimi-
nating any necessity to return to 
a non-bank depositor any items 
he may have failed to indorse. 
2. For the purpose of permit-
t ing items to move rapidly 
through banking_channels. inter*-. 
and payor banks^ media; 
which 
TOTTcs" 
also depositary 
permitted to igriorTTe^ 
strictive indorsements of any per-
son exCgpftlle[bank's immediate" 
"transferor. However, depositary 
banks may not so ignore restric-
tive indorsements. If an owner 
of an item indorses it "for de-
posit" or "for collection" he usu-
ally does so in the belief such in-
dorsement will guard against 
further negotiation of the item to 
a holder in due course by a finder 
or a thief. This belief is reason-
ably justified if at least one bank 
in any chain of banks collecting 
the item has a responsibility to 
act consistently with the in-
dorsement. 
Cross References: 
Sections 3—205, 3—206, 3— 
419, 3—603 and 4—203. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Collecting bank." Section 
4—105. 
"Customer." Section 4—104. 
"Depositary bank". Section 
4—105. 
"Intermediary bank." Section 
4—105. 
"Item." Section 4—104. 
"Payor bank." Section 4—105. 
"Restrictive indorsement." 
Section 3—205. 
390 
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§ 3 — 2 0 5 ^ Restrictive Indorsements 
"An indorsement is restrictive which either 
• i (a) is conditional; or 
"j (b) purports to prohibit further transfer of the instrument ; 
or 
(c) includes the words "for collection", "fondeposit", "pay 
any bank", or like terms signifying a purpose of de-
posit or collection; or 
i- *M 
(d) otherwise states that it is for the benefit or use of the 
f M 
-f. 
'I 
indorser or of another person. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provi-
sion: Sections 36 and 39, Uni-
form Negotiable Instruments 
Law. 
Changes: Combined and reword-
ed; new provisions. 
Purposes of Changes and New 
Matter: 
1. This section is intended to 
provide a definition of restrictive 
indorsements which will include 
the varieties of indorsement de-
scribed in original Sections 36 
and 39. The separate mention 
of conditional indorsements, 
those prohibiting transfer, in-
dorsements in the bank deposit 
or collection process, and other 
indorsements to a fiduciary, per-
mits separate treatment in sub-
sequent sections where pdlicy so 
requires. / 
2. This is part of a series of 
changes of the prior uniform 
statutory provisions effected by 
Sections 3—102, 3—205, 3—206, 
3—304, 3—419, 3—603, and in 
Article 4, Sections 4—203 and 
4—205. The purpose of the 
changes is generally to require 
a taker or payor under restrictive 
indorsement to apply or pay val-
ue given consistently with the in-
dorsement, but to provide certain 
exceptions applying to banks in 
the collection process (other than 
depositary banks), and to some 
other takers and payors. 
Cross References: 
Sections 3—102, 3—202(2), 3— 
205, 3—206, 3—304, 3—419, 3— 
603, 4—203 and 4—205. 
Definitional Cross References: 
"Instrument". Section 3—102. 
"Person". Section 1—201. 
§ _ 3 — 2 0 6 . Effect of Restrictive Indorsement 
(1) No restrictive indorsement prevents further transfer or 
negotiation of the instrument .^ 
(2) An intermediary bank, or a payor bank which is not the 
depositary bank, is neither given notice nor otherwise affected 
by a restrictive indorsement of any person except the bank's 
immediate transferor or the person presenting for payment. 
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11 
checking account. 
They had the money and they endorsed the check and 
they guaranteed these men when they passed that check that the| 
check didn't have any problems with a restrictive endorsement 
on it. That's what they got when they got that check from 
Bear River State Bank. Now, that's the nature of a restric-
tive endorsement, and then for them to say, "Nell, the opera-
tions officer had no idea we had a thing" doesn't make a 
difference. They stamp the check. That's actual notice. 
Forget about constructive notice with the Secretary of State1^ 
office. These people saw the checks, passed them through 
12
 I their bank, got the money for these cattle", and then allowed 
13
 Mr. Erickson on other checks to draw the money out of the 
14
 bank. I think that's the end of the case, Your Honor. They 
15
 haven't complied with the restrictive endorsement or they 
waived it. 
17
 THE COURT: In connection— 
18
 MR. DAINES: Your Honor, I just say we're not 
19 • through presenting evidence at this point. 
20
 THE COURT: Well, I was going to rule on your 
21 
motion. 
22 
MR. DAINES: Okay. 
23
 THE COURT: And in connection with the motion, I 
24 
have less validity than others. 
see some validity to that and in several areas, some of which 
25 
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One is the measure of proof as to what was con-
verted if it was converted. We have checks that have amounts 
for cattle and the endorsement itself says, "In executing my 
endorsement of this check I do sell to the Smithfield Live-
stock Auction the described livestock.11 So that the checks 
I think you can presume that this was for livestock and was 
selling livestock, and for a certain amount of money. Whose 
livestock it was we can assume and I would certainly guess 
that certainly a portion of it or a good portion of it was 
probably Mr. Erickson's, but I would be speculating to say 
that all of the cattle of this amount of money was cattle of 
Mr. Erickson's upon which there was a lien. I don't know 
that. I would have to assume it. There's good circumstantial 
evidence that certainly part of it was, and maybe a major por-j 
tion of it was, but I don't know how much. So I would have 
to speculate to come »up with that exact figure. 
I also don't understand, when you come up with a 
figure of $24,919.66, was their shortfall, but that you take 
9,000 off for what they bid in the land for. That would 
bring it down to a different figure. 
There's also some questions that arise because this 
is a security interest in these cattle and other property, 
other personal property, and real property, and there is some 
question here as to a bona fideness of the foreclosure and 
sale, of which the bank took some credit for and they are not 
- J L U /-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
entitled to all of the cattle if the amount of the cattle 
exceeds what they're owed. 
In other words, they are not the bank's cattle in 
the sense that all of these cattle belonged to the bank. 
They only have a security interest in them. And suppose the 
cattle were still there and they hadn't been sold and they 
went against the cattle on their security interest on their 
note and they sold the cattle for twice the amount of what 
was owed them. That doesn't mean they get to keep it all, 
the money. They'd have to give back—they could only have 
enough to protect their security interest. 
Now, I think that relates to the bona fide sale of 
other security, because they would only be entitled to the 
amount of their security up to the limit of their debt, and 
15 I if they lower what that security is because of sales that 
16
 I aren't bona fide sales, of course, that does in effect raise 
the liability for the other security of more than it should 
be. 
19 I in other words, if they had sold all of the persona| 
20
 ' property, the tractors and the real property and all of that, 
and sold it and realized so that there was, say, only 5,000 
22
 I left, they could only then foreclose on enough cattle to get 
23
 the remaining five, and when they jeopardize that amount or 
24
 I make the amount lower than it should be, I think this casts 
some doubt, at least some doubt, so there should be some 
17 
18 
21 
25 
1 estoppel at least as it concerns the amount. 
2 But, more important, I think is, first of all, 
3 not only do we not know if all the cattle that were sold 
4 belonged to* and which checks were made to Mr. Ericksor> were 
5 his, but I think the endorsement is important on the back of 
6 that check. What that endorsement is saying, or at least I 
7 interpret it as saying, is that Smithfield Livestock Auction, 
8 who puts that endorsement on there, is saying, "I am to my 
9 bank authorizing them to pay to Mr. Erickson X number of 
10 dollars provided he signs the endorsement on the back guaran-
11 teeing that there are no mortgages and that if there are any 
12 mortgages then the release of the person who has the mortgage 
13 is required for this check to be any good at all." I think 
14 that's what the restrictive endorsement says. 
15 Now, I think this is where the waiver comes in, or 
16 I mean the estoppel comes in, is that the bank, Bear River 
17 Bank, now successor the plaintiff, takes in the check knowing 
18 what the restrictive endorsement is and says that this is for 
19 a sale of livestock and you are to pay out the money or 
20 collect, in this case being the collecting bank, and give the 
21 money to Mr. Erickson by placing it in his account, only if 
22
 the livestock is mortgaged that you have the mortgagee's 
23 endorsement on it. That's what he's telling them. 
24 Now, they are telling the person who knows they are 
25
 mortgaged, and I say that they then, if they give Mr. 
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Erickson the money knowing that they have to put their 
endorsement on it for there to be any liability on the check 
by Smithfield Livestock Auction, that they cannot now come and 
say, "Hey, we want the money for those cattle that were sold." 
They had every way to get it at the very time they took in the 
checks. That is, either refuse to credit the money or sign 
the endorsement as the mortgagee. And for that reason I don't 
think they can now come and say, "Hey, we were ignorant of 
these checks coming in for payment of cattle and giving 
Mr. Erickson the money for him to do what he wants with and 
not protecting ourselves on our mortgage," when they had the 
mortgage endorsement restrictions on the back of the check, 
and I think that's the most important p a r t — 
MR. DAINES: Okay. 
THE COURT: —together with these others, and would 
grant the motion. 
MR. DAINES: Thank you, Your Honor. 
MR. SHIELDS: Your Honor, if I may inquire briefly, 
what's the court's interpretation of the Section 4-203? 
That's the concern I have. 
THE COURT: Section which one? 
MR. SHIELDS: 70A-4-203. 
MR. DAINES: I'll give it to the court if the court 
wants to see it. It's right here, Your Honor. 4-203. 
THE COURT: Well, I don't think this has any effect 
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on what I'm saying as to the restrictive endorsement, as to 
it just being a collecting bank. If the collecting bank were 
not given notice by the endorsement itself to themselves as 
mortgagee. I'm saying where the restrictive endorsement 
gives the collecting bank who is taking the money and saying, 
"Key, I'm giving you this money and will collect it for you 
and put it in your account," knowing or with constructive 
notice that they are in fact the mortgagee and know what the 
restrictive endorsement is. If they were a collecting bank 
who didn't have a mortgage on these cattle, I don't think 
that it would—I think then 70A-4-203 would apply and they 
have no liability. 
MR. SHIELDS: So the fact that we held the mortgage 
in addition to collecting the checks is the basis of the 
court's ruling? 
THE COURT: And this gave them the notice and still 
they gave the money, collected the money and collected it and 
gave credit to Mr. Erickson for it, with notice of this 
endorsement and with notice that they have a mortgage on 
cattle he's selling. He says cattle right on the endorse-
ment. That's what I think makes the liability, not just 
simply the fact that they're the collecting bank. 
MR. SHIELDS: So my understanding of the court's 
ruling of no cause of action is based upon the restrictive 
endorsement. We've had other assertions, but that's t h e — 
-111-
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THE COURT: Yeah. I think 70A-4-203 would protect 
you if you did—if you were not the mortgagee on what the 
endorsement says the restriction is for and ignored it. With 
notice that this is being—that money is given out and "We're 
collecting it to put in your account on the basis of selling 
our mortgaged property." Nov; how can you come back and say, 
"Because at that time we didn't protect ourselves even with 
notice," and say, "Hey, this is Mr. Erickson, this money is 
for the sale of cattle we have mortgaged and so we want the 
money," or something, but to totally ignore it and then wait 
two or three years later and come back and say, "Hey, we have 
a shortfall here, we want the money now," is I think where 
the defect comes in. Not the fact that they're the collecting] 
bank but because of those other three factors that fit in with) 
it: notice that if they are mortgaged the mortgagee must 
endorse; second, they know they are the mortgagee, and still 
then knowing they are the mortgagee on what money is for by 
the description of the endorsement itself, still give 
Mr. Erickson the money. 
They waived, I think, their right to have the money 
when they could have collected it at that time. 
MR. SHIELDS: So the court's carving out an excep-
tion to 4-203 if there's a collecting bank— 
THE COURT: A particular set of circumstances. 
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, I'm uncomfortable having 
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further descr ip t ions , because I presume that to allege that 
you're carving out an exception to 203, I don ' t think—I 
think the exception i s in the re . 
THE COURT: I don' t think I'm carving out an 
exception. I think what I'm saying under the present circum-
stances— 
MR. DAINES: That 's r i g h t . 
THE COURT: —this doesn ' t protect you. 
MR. DAINES: Right. 
Z4R. SHIELDS: Because we are the mortgagee in 
addition to being the collecting bank? 
THE COURT: And having notice by the endorsement 
itself. 
MR. SHIELDS: That's what I need to know. 
THE COURT: The language of the endorsement. 
Whether you call it a restrictive endorsement or whatever, 
although it is, but there's also additional language in the 
endorsement as to exactly what's being sold, and if you think 
he's selling his cattle, he's told you 
MR. DAINES: 
supposed to write the 
concl 
make 
THE COURT: 
usions of law an 
it at least ten 
MR. DAINES: 
Thank you 
— 
I suspect 
d pursuant 
pages. 
Yes, Your 
, Your 
so in 
Honor. 
the ( 
I 
you want findings 
to the 
Honor, 
latest 
ad in 
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of fact 
decision wi 
finitum. 
I'm 
and 
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(Court adjourned at 4:45 p.m.) 
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ceedings held in the within-named matter on the date indica-
ted therein, to-wit: October 15, 1986. 
DATED October 31, 1986. 
' l4-i-4i 
13| CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER. LIC. #27, 
14 
15 
16 
17 
8 
A P P E N D I X "C 
A-3 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130-0815 
Telephone: (801) 535-1054 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. 
SMITHFIELD LIVESTOCK AUCTION, 
Defendant. ) 
> FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 23859 
The above captioned matterf having come duly before the Court 
for trialf the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersenf Judgef presiding, and 
sitting without juryf on the 15th day of October, 1986, at the Cache 
County Courthouse, Logan, Utah, and the plaintiff having appeared by 
and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and the defendant 
having appeared by and through counsel, N. George Daines, and the 
plaintiff having presented testimony and evidence, and the defendant 
having cross-examined the same, and the plaintiff having rested its 
case in chief, and the defendant having moved for directed verdict 
thereon, and the Court having ruled on said motion for directed 
verdict and having made certain findings and conclusions in regard 
thereto and being duly advised in the premises, the Court now makes 
and enters its; 
(•-.j-nber r^3S3> /-?$) 
1 ^ 6 SL1H S,filL£N, Clerk
 60liK 6 5 fACE GO 
* » - £& Deputy 
FINDINGS OF FACT AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff Commercial Security Bank is a Utah banking 
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and doing business in Cache County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Plaintiff, Commercial Security Bank, is the successor in 
interest to Bear River State Bank, which was merged with Commercial 
Security Bank on or about March 31, 1984. 
3. Defendant, Smithfield Livestock Auction, is a Utah 
corporation doing business in Cache County, State of Utah and is a 
licensed livestock auction agent. 
4. On or about June 8, 1982, William C. Erickson and Susan 
S. Erickson (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Ericksons"), 
for valuable consideration, executed and delivered to plaintiff a 
certain promissory note in the original principal sum of $50,000.00 
together with interest accruing as stated therein. 
5. In furtherance of said loan transaction and as security 
therefore, Ericksons, on or about June 8, 1982, executed and 
delivered to the plaintiff a certain security agreement wherein and 
whereby they pledged as security for the note all livestock "now 
owned or hereafter acquired", including but not limited to 33 
Holstein cows, 67 Holstein heifers, 16 Holstein steers and 13 
Holstein calves (hereinafter referred to as the "livestock"), along 
with certain other specified items of farm equipment. 
6. As a part of the same loan transaction with the 
plaintiff, Ericksons executed and delivered to the plaintiff a 
certain U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement to the collateral recited in 
6K
»- UD iu Gl 
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the security agreement, which financing statement was filed with the 
office of the Utah Secretary of State on June 23, 1982 as Entry No. 
880544. 
7. During all times relevant to this action, the defendant 
was conducting a livestock auction and marketing business located in 
Cache County, State of Utah. 
8. From at least June 8, 1982 until May 1983, Ericksons kept 
and maintained a checking account in their joint names at 
plaintiff's predecessorf Bear River State Bankf at Tremontonf Utahf 
account number 124301740-57-71917-1. 
9. Between the dates of June 15, 1982 and October 14, 1982, 
inclusive, Ericksons consigned certain livestock for sale to 
defendant Smithfield Livestock Auction. Said sales were conducted 
on 12 separate occasions and following each sale, the defendant 
issued to Erickson its check representing the gross amount of the 
proceeds realized from the auction of the livestock on that 
particular occasion less a commission of $7.00 per head sold. All 
of said 12 checks issued by the defendant to Erickson bore William 
C. Erickson as the sole payee thereon and all were deposited for 
collection to the Erickson checking account at Bear River State Bank 
by Erickson. Specifically, the date of the check, the check number, 
and amount of the check and the date deposited by Erickson are as 
follows: 
- 3 - ir>8 
BGur 65 fa G2 
Check Date 
July 1, 1982 
July 1, 1982 
July 8r 1982 
July 15, 1982 
July 29, 1982 
August 5, 1982 
August 5, 1982 
August 12, 1982 
August 22, 1982 
August 26, 1982 
September 30, 1982 
October 14, 1982 
Check Number 
16396 
16373 
16588 
16757 
17108 
17217 
17266 
17430 
17598 
17778 
18620 
18920 
Amount of Check 
$ 1,761.40 
1,336.85 
381.81 
1,744.40 
2,544.10 
1,022.34 
979.70 
2,589.10 
1,339.40 
2,189.10 
1,892.56 
3.088.42 
Date Deposited 
July 2, 1982 
July 2, 1982 
July 14, 1982 
-indecipherable-
July 30, 1982 
August 6, 1982 
August 6, 1982 
August 13, 1982 
August 23, 1982 
August 26, 1982 
October 1, 1982 
October 15, 1982 
TOTAL: $2Qr869.18 
9. The 12 above specified checks issued by the defendant to 
William C. Erickson contained on the back side thereof the following 
printed endorsement instructions: "In executing my endorsement of 
this checkf I do sell to the Smithfield Livestock Auction Inc. the 
herein described livestock, and I guarantee that I am the owner of 
said livestock and that said livestock are clear of any mortgages, 
liens or encumbrances. If livestock are mortgaged, mortgagees 
endorsement or release of mortgage is released. Please endorse 
below." 
10. Each and every check of the said 12 checks from the 
defendant to Erickson bore only the endorsement of William C. 
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Erickson and of no other person or party whatsoverf and all of the 
same were collected by plaintiff's predecessor, Bear River State 
Bank and no deduction or offset was exercised by Bear River State 
Bank against the checking account into which said checks were 
deposited and collected. 
11. Each of the above specified checks was issued by the 
defendant to William C. Erickson within 3 or 4 business days of the 
date the livestock sale to which each such check was applicable. 
12. During the year 1982f the Smithfield Livestock Auction had 
no procedures or methods in place by which to investigate or verify 
whether livestock which was brought to it for sale was subject to a 
D.C.C. 1 filing on behalf of a secured creditor with the Utah 
Secretary of State. 
13. During the year 1982, due to its knowledge and experience 
in the industry, the defendant assumed as a matter of course that at 
least 90% of all livestock brought to it for sale was subject to a 
lien or mortgage of some kind. 
14. The loan obligation of June 8, 1982 from plaintiff's 
predecessor in interest to Ericksons remained in a current and non 
delinquent status until April of 1983 at which time it became 
delinquent. 
15. On May 10, 1983, Ericksons filed a joint petition for 
relief under Title 11, United States Code in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, case number 83M-0305. 
Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Bear River State Bank, was 
named as a creditor in that proceeding. Defendant Smithfield 
Livestock Auction was not named as a creditor in that proceeding at 
~
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any time. Ericksons were discharged in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 
thereof by order of the United States Bankruptcy Court dated and 
entered August 2, 1983. 
16. Pursuant to the default of Erickson under the note of June 
8f 1982 and pursuant to the security agreement executed thereon, 
plaintiff's predecessor. Bear River State Bank, obtained relief from 
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court and exercised against the collateral 
pledged thereto by Erickson. Specifically, plaintiff received a 
payment of $1,500.00 from Erickson in consideration of one of two 
John Deere Tractors subject to the security agreement which 
plaintiff was unable to locate; plaintiff repossessed and sold the 
second John Deere Tractor which was the subject of the security 
agreement to Golden Spike Equipment Company and realized the sum of 
$3,150.00; plaintiff foreclosed the deed of trust on certain 
property which was additional security for the loan and bid in at 
sale thereof the sum of $9,000.00; and plaintiff was unable to 
locate the livestock which was the subject of the security 
agreement. 
17. Following execution against the above specified collateral, 
there was an indebtedness due, owing and unpaid on the June 8, 1982 
note in the total sum of $15,919.66 as of March 14, 1984. 
18. The defendants have not claimed and did not have at any 
time a perfected interest in and to any livestock owned by Erickson. 
19. In the livestock industry, the fair market value of 
livestock is what said livestock will bring at sale at any 
particular time in a regular market therefore and the Smithfield 
Livestock Auction is a regular market for livestock such that its 
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sale of livestock would reflect the fair market value of the same at 
the time and place of sale. 
20. Plaintiff filed its Complaint in the instant case on or 
about April 28, 1985 claiming that the sale by the defendant of 
cattle owned by Erickson and allegedly subject to the security 
interest of the plaintiff was an act of conversion entitling the 
plaintiff to relief against the defendant in the sum of the fair 
market value of the cattle at the time and place of sale. 
WHEREFOREf having heretofore made its Findings of Factf and 
being duly advised in the premises, the Court now makes and enters 
its, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiffs predecessor in interest. Bear River State Bank, 
held and possessed a valid security interest in and to all livestock 
of William S. Erickson and Susan C. Erickson owned or acquired after 
the date of their security agreement, June 8, 1982, the same which 
was duly perfected by a U.C.C. 1 Financing Statement filing with the 
office of the Secretary of State, State of Utah on June 23, 1982. 
2. The loan obligation of William C. Erickson and Susan S. 
Erickson to plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Bear River State 
Bank, of June 8, 1982, remained in current status until April of 
1983, at which time William C. Erickson and Susan S. Erickson 
defaulted thereon. 
3. Plaintiff's predecessor in interest, Bear River State Bank, 
executed against security other than the livestock which it could 
locate, to wit, one John Deere Tractor, and the real estate which 
was the subject of a deed of trust, and collected therefrom 
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$9,000.00 on the trust deed foreclosuref $3f150.00 on the one John 
Deere Tractor which it took into its possession and $1,500.00 
directly from William C. Erickson leaving a delinquent amount in the 
sum of $15,919.66. 
4. Defendant sold livestock through its auction between the 
dates of June 30, 1982 and October 15, 1982, inclusive, purportedly 
belonging to William C. Erickson without actual and formal 
permission of the plaintiff's predecessor, Bear River State Bank. 
5. Plaintiff is estopped from asserting its claim of 
conversion against the defendant and has waived its claim of 
conversion as the plaintiff was the mortgagee of the cattle which 
were sold by the Smithfield Livestock Auction and was in addition 
the collecting bank on the said Smithfield Livestock Auction checks 
paid to William C. Erickson by virtue of Mr. Erickson's deposit of 
those checks into his account at the plaintiff bank, which the 
plaintiff bank collected for Mr. Erickson into his account without 
exercising a right of set off thereagainst; and further, the 
plaintiff is charged with constructive notice of the endorsement 
instructions on the back side of each check and knew or should have 
known from said endorsement instructions that its loan debtor, Mr. 
Erickson, was selling livestock through the Smithfield Livestock 
Auction which was subject to its security interest therein and that 
said checks, pursuant to said endorsement instructions, required the 
endorsement of any mortgage holder and that the payee, William C. 
Erickson, guaranteed to the Smithfield Livestock Auction under the 
terms of said endorsement instructions that said livestock was free 
and clear of any mortgage, lien or interest of any other party. The 
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Court concludes that the the plaintiff v/as on notice of and bound by 
the terms of the endorsement instructions on the back of each of the 
Smithfield Livestock Auction checks notwithstanding the provisions 
of Utah Code Annotated 70A-4-203, as amended, inasmuch as the 
plaintiff was the mortgage holder of the cattle in question in 
addition to being the "collecting bank" as provided in said statute 
and was therefore on notice of and bound by the endorsement 
instructions on said checks. 
4. The Court concludes that such estoppel and waiver is a 
defense to a claim of conversion and therefore concludes that the 
defendant is entitled to a judgment of dismissal, no cause of 
action. 
5. The Court further concludes that neither party has shown 
authority for an award of attorney's fees and the same should not be 
awarded. 
Lh 
DATED this ^ H ^ day of November, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: . / 
Ve No^ C^istdffersen 
First District Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
) , • > I hereby c e r t i f y t h a t on t h e /*7~??L day of 0',i 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law to the following: 
N. George Danes 
Attorney for Defendant 
128 North Main St. 
Logan, Utah 84321 ^-, 
// ^ A>..7 r/o:y . \U 
T : 
Deanna D. Sabey ( 
1"5
 600* 65 iU G9 
JEFFREY WESTON SHIELDS (A 2948) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK 
50 South Main Street, Suite 2011 
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 84130-0815 
Telephone: (801) 535-1054 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, a 
Utah banking corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITHFIELD LIVESTOCK AUCTION, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Civil No. 23859 
The above captioned matter having come duly before the Court 
for trial, the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, Judge, presiding, and 
sitting without jury, on the 15th Day of October, 1986, at the Cache 
County Courthouse, Logan, Utah, and the plaintiff having appeared by 
and through counsel, Jeffrey Weston Shields, and the defendant 
having appeared by and through counsel, N. George Daines, and the 
plaintiff having presented testimony and evidence, and the defendant 
having cross-examined the same, and the plaintiff having rested its 
case in chief, and the defendant having moved for directed verdict 
thereon, and the Court having ruled thereon and the Court having 
herein made and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and being duly informed in the premises, it is now by the Court, 
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.umber ^X^'V-pCp 
VfM7 o T 
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btlH % ALLEN, Clerk 
JUL 
fcOC 
Deputy 
tiCi 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
That platintiff's Complaint is herewith dismissed with 
prejudice, no cause of action. 
DATED this 3-^ —' day of November, 1986. 
BY T$Ei .COURT: 
VeNtty' Christof f ersen^ 
First District Judge' 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the J/TyfO day of 
1986, I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment of 
Dismissal to the following: 
N. George Danes 
Attorney for Defendant 
128 North Main St. 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Deanna D. Sabey 
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